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Abstract
We analyze diffusion of an abatement technology in an imperfectly competitive in-
dustry under a standard emission tax compared to an emission tax which is refunded
in proportion to output market share. The results indicate that refunding can speed up
diffusion if firms do not strategically influence the size of the refund. If they do, it is am-
biguous whether diffusion is slower or faster than under a non-refunded emission tax.
Moreover, it is ambiguous whether refunding continues over time to provide larger in-
centives for technological upgrading than a non-refunded emission tax, since the effects
of refunding dissipate as the overall industry becomes cleaner.
Keywords: emission tax, refund, abatement technology, technology diffusion, imperfect
competition
JEL Classification: H23, O33, O38, Q52
1 Introduction
From a welfare point of view, the optimal rate of adoption of environmentally friendly tech-
nologies should balance the investment costs against the benefits of adoption in terms of
reduced environmental damages and lower abatement costs. Nevertheless, the interplay
of technology and environmental market failures implies that markets often underinvest in
new technology. It is unlikely that environmental policy alone creates sufficient incentives
for technological change - strengthening the case for second-best policies (Jaffe et al., 2005).
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In theory, a strong and stable price of emissions implemented through an emission tax
should induce both investment in R&D and a “cost-effective” allocation among firms of the
burden of achieving given levels of environmental protection. In reality, however, introduc-
ing such an emission tax may prove politically infeasible since regulated firms will often
argue that they will lose international competitiveness. As well as job losses if firms relocate
or close, an additional concern is the relocation of pollution, or so-called emission leakage in
the case of transboundary pollution such as greenhouse gas emissions.
One potential way of making emission taxes more politically feasible is to refund the tax
revenues to the regulated industry (Hagem et al., 2012; Aidt, 2010; Fredriksson & Sterner,
2005). One method for such refunding is to refund the revenues in proportion to the output
market share. This is the approach that Swedish policy makers used in 1992 when intro-
ducing a charge on emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) from large combustion plants. The
policy was explicitly intended to affect technology adoption. The refunding scheme en-
abled the introduction of an emission charge sufficiently high to induce abatement (Sterner
& Ho¨glund-Isaksson, 2006). This tax and refunding scheme, sometimes referred to as re-
funded emission payment (REP), has been extensively studied in the theoretical literature
concerning the incentives for emission abatement and production and how it compares to
optimal policy; see e.g., Fischer (2011), Cato (2010), Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson (2006) and
Gersbach & Requate (2004)1. From the empirical side, Sterner & Turnheim (2009) study the
effects of the Swedish refunded charge on NOx emissions. Their results indicate that the
charge had a very substantial role in explaining the sharp decrease in NOx emission inten-
sities; not only did the best plants make rapid progress in emission reductions, but there
was also considerable catching up, such that today the majority of plants have lowered their
emission intensities much more relative to the cleanest plants.
In this paper, we model the pattern of adoption of environmentally friendly technologies
under a ”standard” emission tax (hereinafter, emission tax) and an emission tax for which
the revenues are returned to the aggregate of taxed firms in proportion to output (hereinafter,
1Gersbach& Requate (2004) and Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson (2006) analyze the incentives for abatement
and production provided by an output based refunding scheme in markets characterized by imperfect and
perfect competition, respectively. Cato (2010) studies the effects of refunding on market structure, showing
that a refunding systemmight have to be complemented with an entry license to ensure that the system does not
encourage too much market entry. Finally, Fischer (2011) studies the performance of refunding schemes when
firms can strategically influence the size of the refund; since firms know that part of any emissions rents they
create will be returned to them, refunding discourages large firms from abating emissions and subsidizes high
emitters to a greater extent.
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refunded tax)2. We consider the case of exogenous refunding, where firms take the size of the
refund as given, vis-a-vis endogenous refunding, where firms recognize that a share of their
emissions tax payments will be returned to them3. To the best of our knowledge, despite
a growing body of literature analyzing the incentives for technological diffusion provided
by different environmental policy instruments (see for instance van Soest (2005) and Coria
(2009)), this is the first study investigating the effects of refunding an emission tax.
Like Coria (2009), our setting makes use of the framework by Reinganum (1981), who
considers an industry composed of symmetric firms that engage in Cournot competition in
the output market. When a technology that reduces the cost of compliance with an emission
tax appears, each firm must decide when to adopt it, based in part upon the discounted
cost of implementing it and in part upon the behavior of the rival firms. If a firm adopts a
technology before its rivals, it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the
other firms, since the cost advantage allows it to increase its output market share. On the
other hand, the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline if the
adjustment period lengthens, as various quasi-fixed factors become adjustable. Therefore,
although waiting costs more in terms of forgone profits, it may save money on purchasing
the new technology. Reinganum (1981) showed that diffusion, as opposed to immediate
adoption, occurred purely due to strategic behavior in the output market, since adoptions
that yield lower incremental benefits are deferred until they are justified by lower adoption
costs.
Our results indicate that exogenous refunding of an emission tax based on output re-
inforces the mechanism described by Reinganum (1981). Hence, technology diffuses faster
into an imperfectly competitive industry if the regulator refunds the emission tax revenues
but the firms do not recognize the impact of adoption on the average emission intensity. The
intuition behind this result is straightforward: if the refund is based on output, adopters
receive a net refund as the system rewards those firms that are cleaner than average. How-
ever, the incremental effect of the refund over taxes decreases as more and more firms adopt
because of the lower overall pollution intensity and thus lower refund.
2A distinction can be made between an emission tax and an emission charge where revenues from a tax go to
the general budget and revenues from a charge are earmarked for a specific purpose (Sterner, 2003). Although
refunding would make the emission tax a charge according to this definition, we will throughout the paper refer
to the refunded charge as a refunded tax.
3Fischer (2011) refers to exogenous refunding as ”fixed subsidy”, and to an emission tax with an endogenous
output-based rebate as the ”refunded tax”.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of technological diffu-
sion. Section 3 and 4 analyze the adoption incentives provided by emission taxes with and
without refunding, respectively. Section 5 analyzes technological catching up under the two
policies. Section 6 presents numerical simulations and section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Assume an imperfectly competitive and stationary industry, where n firms choose their level
of production simultaneously and compete in quantities. The inverse demand function is
given by
P(Q) = a  bQ,
whereQ = åni=1 q
i and a, b > 0. The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale
such that total variable costs are given by
Ci = c0qi.
Production also generates emissions of a homogenous pollutant and emissions from firm
i. ei, are proportional to output qi according to
ei = #0qi.
To control emissions, the regulator has implemented a tax s that each firm must pay for
each unit of emission.
At date t = 0, an innovation in emissions abatement technology is announced. The new
technology reduces the emission intensity from #0 to #1, i.e. #1 < #0, and also changes the
marginal cost of production from c0 to c14. Firms must now decide when to adopt the new
technology, taking into account the effect of the competitors’ adoption on pre- and post-
adoption profit flows. Note that c0 + s#0 > c1 + s#1 by assumption to ensure that the rate
of profit flow (quasi-rent) is higher with the new technology. Moreover, we assume that no
future technical advance is anticipated.
Let p0(m1) be the rate of (Cournot-Nash) profit flow for firm i when m1 out of n firms
4As noted by Fischer (2011), this characterization is suitable for end-of-pipe technologieswhich scrub a certain
proportion of emissions. It is also a good representation of a technology that improves fuel efficiency, which
means that it reduces emissions per unit of electricity or useful heat of pollutants, which are highly correlated
with fuel use (such as CO2 and SO2).
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have adopted the cleaner technology and firm i has not. Next, let p1(m1) be the rate of profit
flow for firm iwhenm1 firms have adopted the cleaner technology and firm i is among them.
We assume that both p0(m1) and p1(m1) are known with certainty for all m1.
Further, the following assumptions are made.
(1i) p0(m1   1)  0 and p1(m1)  0
(1ii) p1(m1   1)  p0(m1   2) > p1(m1)  p0(m1   1) > 0 for all m1  n.
Assumption (1ii) states that the increase in the profit rate from adopting as the (m1  1)th
firm should be higher than the increase in profit rate from adopting as the m1th firm. This is
to say, a firm that adopts earlier has a larger ”relative” cost advantage than if it adopts later
due to the strategic interaction in the output market.
Let ti denote firm i’s date of adoption and let p1(ti) be the present value of the in-
vestment cost for the new technology, including both purchase price and adjustment costs.
We assume that p1(t) is a differentiable convex function with p01(0)  p0(0)   p1(1) (2i),
limt !¥ p01(t) > 0 (2ii) and p
00
1 (t) > re
 rt (p1(1)  p0(0)) (2iii). Assumption (2i) ensures that
immediate adoption is too costly, while assumption 2(ii) ensures that the costs of adoption
decrease over time, but do not decrease indefinitely. This implies that there is an efficient
scale of adjustment beyond which adoption costs increase again. Moreover, assumption
2(iii) ensures that the objective function defining the optimal timing of adoption is locally
concave on the choice of adoption dates.
Further, we define Vi(t1, ..., ti 1, ti, ti+1, ..., tn) to be the present value of firm i’s profits
net of any investment costs for the new technology when firm k adopts at tk, k = 1, .., n.
Given an ordering of adoption dates t1  t2  ...  tn, we can write the present value of
firm i’s profits as
Vi(t1, ..., ti 1, ti, ti+1, ..., tn) =
i 1
å
m1=0
tm1+1Z
tm1
p0(m1)e rtdt+
n
å
m1=i
tm1+1Z
tm1
p1(m1)e rtdt  p1(ti),
where t0 = 0 and tn+1 = ¥.
Maximization of Vi given the ordering t1  t2  ...  tn (and thus the restriction
ti 1  ti  ti+1) gives each firm i an optimal date of adoption, ti , and is implicitly defined
by
¶Vi
¶ti
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti   p01(ti ) = 0. (1)
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This first-order condition says that it is optimal to adopt the new technology on the date
when the present value of the cost of waiting to adopt (the increase in profit rate due to
adoption) is equal to the present value of the benefit of waiting to adopt (the decrease in
investment cost). We define Dpi = p1(i)  p0(i  1) and (1) can then be written
¶Vi
¶ti
=  Dpie rti   p01(ti ) = 0,
i = 1, ..., n. Furthermore, Vi is strictly concave at ti for all i. As shown by Reinganum
(1981), there are n! sequences in which the adoption date defined by (1) is a Nash equilibrium
(demonstration in Appendix A). This result holds regardless of firms being homogenous
when the adoption decision is made at time 0 5.
To further encourage adoption of new abatement technologies, the regulator has consid-
ered refunding the emission tax revenues to the firms in proportion to market share. In the
following sections, we characterize one of the n! sequences of adoption, analyzing the impact
of refunding on the optimal date of adoption. That is, we analyze the difference in adoption
profits Dpi between a standard emission tax and an emission tax refunded in proportion to
output. A higher Dpi implies faster adoption (a lower ti ) because of the concavity of V
i(ti )
and vice versa.
3 Adoption incentives under an emission tax
If we have m1 adopters of the new technology and rank the firms according to their order
in the adoption sequence (taking it as given), we can write the profit rate maximization
problem for the adopters as
p j = max
qj
[P(Q)  c1   s#1] qj,
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
and the profit maximization problem for the n m1 non-adopters as
5To keep the analysis mathematically tractable and simple, we assume that firms are homogeneous in terms of
their emissions intensity. Nevertheless, our results still hold if firmswere heterogeneous. For example, following
Coria (2009), we could have assumed that firms can be ordered according to their adoption profits from the
firm with the highest to the firm with the lowest current emissions intensity. Under certain assumptions, such
a setting would ensure a unique equilibrium for the adoption sequence. However, the comparison between
refunded and non-refunded emission taxes would remain the same as the main driver behind technological
diffusion in the model is the strategic interaction in the output market.
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p j = max
qj
[P(Q)  c0   s#0] qj,
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
The first order conditions for the adopters and non-adopters respectively are
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c1 + s#1,
j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c0 + s#0,
j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Thus, both types of firms set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs inclusive of the
tax payment for the emissions embodied in an additional unit of output. Because marginal
cost is lower for the adopters, they produce more than non-adopters.
We define the profit-maximizing level of production for the m1 adopters under an emis-
sion tax to be qT1 and the profit-maximizing level of production for the n m1 non-adopters
to be qT0 . We further assume that q
T
0 > 0
6. Now, if we let zT0 = c0 + s#0 denote marginal costs
inclusive of emission tax payments under an emission tax before adoption of the new tech-
nology and let zT1 = c1 + s#1 denote marginal costs after adoption, the equilibrium output
levels under an emission tax for adopters and non-adopters, respectively, are
qT1 (m1) =
a  zT1 + [n m1]

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]
,
qT0 (m1) =
a  zT0  m1

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]
,
for which qT1 (m1) > q
T
0 (m1) > 0 and q
T
1 (m1)   qT1 (m1   1) = qT0 (m1)   qT0 (m1   1) < 0 _
m1  n.
Furthermore, qT1 (m1) > q
T
0 (m1   1) _m1. That is, adoption allows firms to increase their
output. Moreover, it allows adopters to increase their market share since, due to strategic
behavior in the output market, non-adopters reduce their output to offset the effect of an
increased supply on the market price.
6From the equilibrium output level for technology 0 given below, it is clear that this assumption is satisfied
for all m1  n  1 if a  n [c0 + s#0] + [n  1] [c1 + s#1] > 0
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Under an emission tax with m1 adopters of the new technology, the equilibrium profit
rate for adopters of the new technology is
pT1 (m1) = b
h
qT1 (m1)
i2
,
and the equilibrium profit rate for the non-adopters
pT0 (m1) = b
h
qT0 (m1)
i2
,
see Appendix B for derivation of equilibrium profits and output.
We can now find an expression for the increase in profit rate due to adoption for the firm
that is the ith to adopt, under an emission tax.
DpTi = b
h
qT1 (i)
i2   hqT0 (i  1)i2 . (2)
DpTi is positive but decreasing in i (in accordance with assumption 1ii and demonstrated
in Appendix A.1).
4 Adoption incentives under a refunded tax
Under an emission tax which is refunded to the regulated firms in proportion to output
market share, the profit rate maximization problem for the m1 firms which have adopted the
new technology is
p j = max
qj

[P(Q)  c1   s#1] qj + sEq
j
Q

,
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
and the profit maximization problem for the n m1 non-adopters
p j = max
qj
[P(Q)  c0   s#0] qj + sEq
j
Q
,
j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n, with aggregate emissions (E) and aggregate output (Q) given
by:
E =
n
å
i=1
ei
Q =
n
å
i=1
qi
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and the average emission intensity #(m1) given by:
#(m1) =
m1#1q1 + [n m1] #0q0
m1q1 + [n m1] q0 > 0 _m1. (3)
4.1 Exogenous Refunded Tax
With reference to the Swedish NOx charge, we first focus on the case where the number
of firms in the industry is large enough so that each firm considers its own impact on the
average emission intensity (and therefore also the size of the refund) as neglible7.
The first order conditions for the adopters and non-adopters respectively are then
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c1 + s [#1   #] , (4)
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c0 + s [#0   #] , (5)
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Thus both types of firms set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs inclusive of the
emission tax minus the marginal refund. The marginal refund is given by the emission tax
rate times the average emission intensity and works as an implicit output subsidy. Thus,
just as under an emission tax, adopters produce more than non-adopters because of lower
marginal cost. However, output will be higher for both adopters and non-adopters under a
refunded tax because of the refund.
We define the profit-maximizing level of production for adopters under an emission tax
with exogenous refunding to be qX1 and the profit-maximizing level of production for non-
adopters to be qX0 . If q
T
0 > 0, the equilibrium output levels under an exogenously refunded
7In the case of the Swedish NOx charge, market power in the market for refunding is not a major concern.
Although participants include large producers in industries that may not be perfectly competitive, in 2000 no
plant had more than roughly 2% of the rebate market (Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson, 2006), since the tax-refund
program includes several industries. Thus, by applying the program broadly, Sweden avoids the market-share
issues that could arise with sector-specific programs (see Fischer 2011).
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tax for adopters and non-adopters, respectively, are
qX1 (m1) = q
T
1 (m1) +
s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
, (6)
qX0 (m1) = q
T
0 (m1) +
s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
, (7)
where #X(m1) =
m1#1qX1 +[n m1]#0qX0
m1qX1 +[n m1]qX0
> 0. Because the average emissions intensity decreases
with the number of firms adopting the new technology8, the difference in output with and
without a refund decreases as m1 increases. Equilibrium profit rates under a refunded tax
with m1 adopters of the new technology are
pX1 (m1) = b
h
qX1 (m1)
i2
,
pX0 (m1) = b
h
qX0 (m1)
i2
,
see Appendix B for derivation of equilibrium profits and output.
We can now find an expression for the increase in profit rate due to adoption for the firm,
which is the ith to adopt, under an exogenous refunded tax.
DpXi = b
h
qX1 (i)
i2   hqX0 (i  1)i2 .
Substituting in (6), we have that
DpXi = b
24"qT1 (i) + s#X(i)b [n+ 1]
#2
 
"
qT0 (i  1) +
s#X(i  1)
b [n+ 1]
#235 . (8)
Since each firm considers its own impact on the average emission intensity as negligible,
#X(i) = #X(i  1) from the perspective of the firm, and hence (8) simplifies to
DpXi = Dp
T
i +
2s#X(i)
[n+ 1]
h
qT1 (i)  qT0 (i  1)
i
.
The difference in the increase in profit rate from adoption under a standard emission tax
compared to an exogenous refunded tax is then given by
8Let s1(m1) to denote themarket share of an individual adopter withm1 adopters in the industry. The average
emission intensity can be represented as #(m1) = #0 m1s1(m1)d,where d = #0  #1.Note that #(m1) < #(m1  1)
if [m1   1]s1(m1   1) < m1s1(m1). That is to say, the average emission intensity decreases with adoption if the
total output share of adopters increases with adoption.
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DpXi   DpTi = 2
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
s#X(i), (9)
since qT1 (i)  qT0 (i  1) =
n[zT0 zT1 ]
b[n+1] > 0.
Under these assumptions, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 A technology that reduces the emission intensity of production diffuses faster under
an exogenously refunded than under a non-refunded emission tax.
We see from (9) that, for the same tax per unit of emissions, s, DpXi > Dp
T
i . That is,
the diffusion of the new technology is faster under the exogenous refunded tax. However,
since the average emission intensity and the refund decreases as the technology diffuses into
the industry, it is optimal for the late adopters to wait longer to adopt relative to the early
adopters so that investment cost goes down further with time. The additional impact of the
refund over taxes therefore diminishes for the firms later in the adoption sequence.
4.2 Endogenous Refunded Tax
So far we have assumed that each firm considers its own impact on the average emission
intensity and thus the size of the refund as negligible. However, since firms in the present
framework have market power in the output market and emissions are proportional to out-
put, it is appropriate to also consider the case where firms have market power in the market
for refunding. If firms take into account their influence on the size of the refund, the first
order condition for the adopters are
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c1 + s [#1   #]

1  q
j
Q

, (10)
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
and for non-adopters
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c0 + s [#0   #]

1  q
j
Q

, (11)
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Let qD1 and q
D
0 be the profit-maximizing level of production for adopters and non-adopters,
respectively, under endogenous refunding. DefiningQX (m1) = m1qX1 +[n m1] qX0 ,QD (m1) =
11
m1qD1 + [n m1] qD0 and #D(m1) = m1#1q
D
1 +[n m1]#0qD0
QD > 0, it can be shown from the equilib-
rium conditions in (4) and (5), and (10) and (11) (see Appendix C), that
QD(m1) QX(m1) = nsb [n+ 1]
h
#D(m1)  #X(m1)
i
,
i.e., total output under endogenous and exogenous refunding is the same only if the av-
erage emissions intensities #D(m1) and #X(m1) are the same. Thus, comparing the FOCs
that define the profit-maximizing level of production for adopters and non-adopters under
exogenous and endogenous refunding (i.e., equations (4)-(10) for adopters and (5)-(11) for
non-adopters), we can say that, for equivalent average emission intensity, qX1 > q
D
1 _m1 < n
and qX0 < q
D
0 _m1 > 0. Hence, more production is shifted toward non-adopters under
endogenous refunding compared to exogenous refunding for equivalent average emission
intensity (see also, Fischer 2011, pp 223). Furthermore, qX1 (n) = q
D
1 (n) and q
X
0 (0) = q
D
0 (0)
since the net tax is zero when the firms are homogenous.
As shown in Appendix B, equilibrium profit rates under an endogenous refunded tax
with m1 adopters of the new technology are
pD1 (m1) = b

1  s
bQD (m1)
h
#1   #D(m1)
i h
qD1 (m1)
i2
,
pD0 (m1) = b

1  s
bQD (m1)
h
#0   #D(m1)
i h
qD0 (m1)
i2
.
The increase in profit rate due to adoption for the firm that is the ith to adopt, under a
refunded tax with firm influence on the size of the refund, is then given by
DpDi = b
h
qD1 (i)
i2   hqD0 (i  1)i2 (12)
+ s
"
#0   #D(i  1)

QD (i  1)
h
qD0 (i  1)
i2   #1   #D(i)
QD (i)
h
qD1 (i)
i2#
.
By using equation (3), and that #0 = #1 + d with d > 0, we can write:
#0   #D(m1) = m1sD1 (m1)d, (13)
#1   #D(m1) =   [n m1] sD0 (m1)d,
where sD1 (m1) and s
D
0 (m1) represent the market shares of an individual adopter and non-
adopter, respectively, with m1 adopters in the industry.
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Substituting (13) into (12) yields:
DpDi = b
h
qD1 (i)
i2   hqD0 (i  1)i2 (14)
+ sd
h
[i  1] sD0 (i  1)sD1 (i  1)qD0 (i  1) + [n  i] sD0 (i)sD1 (i)qD1 (i)
i
.
Unfortunately, equation (14) cannot be easily compared to (2) or (8) since output levels
and emission intensities are endogenous. Nevertheless, to be able to say something about the
impact of firms’ strategically influencing the size of the refund and the adoption decision, we
follow the approach in Fischer (2011) and compare adoption incentives between exogenous
and endogenous refunding for an equivalent average emission intensity. That is to say, we
compare adoption profits under exogenous vs. endogenous refunding for the firms which
are the first and last to adopt. This yields:
DpD1   DpX1 = b
h
qD1 (1)
i2   hqX1 (1)i2+ hsd [n  1] sD0 (1)sD1 (1)qD1 (1)i , (15)
and
DpDn   DpXn = b
h
qX0 (n  1)
i2   hqD0 (n  1)i2 (16)
+
h
sd [n  1] sD0 (n  1)sD1 (n  1)qD0 (n  1)
i
.
Note that the first term (in brackets) on the right hand side of equations (15) and (16) gives
account of the differences in profits due to output. In turn, the second term (in brackets) on
the right hand side of equations (15) and (16) gives account of the differences in profits due
to the size of the refund. As stated before, for equivalent average emissions intensities, pro-
duction is shifted toward non-adopters under endogenous refunding (i.e., qD1 (1) < q
X
1 (1)
and qX0 (n   1) < qD0 (n   1)). Consequently, this production shifting lowers the benefit of
adoption under endogenous versus exogenous refunding for the firms which are the first
and last to adopt. However, because production is shifted toward non-adopters, the aver-
age emission intensity is larger under endogenous refunding, and so is the refund, which
increases the benefits of adoption under endogenous versus exogenous refunding.
Therefore, equations (15) and (16) indicate that it is ambiguous whether adoption will be
slower under endogenous than under exogenous refunding because of the existence of two
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counteracting effects: a negative ”output” effect and a positive ”refunding” effect. Overall,
we expect the magnitude of the ”output” effect to be larger9, and hence, adoption profits to
be larger under exogenous refunding. However, the larger the number of firms in the in-
dustry, the smaller should be the difference between exogenous and endogenous refunding,
because the strategic interaction between firms in the output market is reduced in such a
case. Note also that the ”refunding” effect depends critically on the effect of adoption on
emissions per unit of output, i.e., the larger is d, the larger the increase in emissions from
shifting production toward non-adopters, and the larger is the ”refunding” effect. These
observations lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A technology that reduces the emission intensity of production tends to diffuse more
slowly under an endogenously vs. an exogenously refunded emission tax the more concentrated the
industry is.
Next, we compare the adoption incentives under an endogenous refunded tax and an
emission tax for the firm which is first to adopt and the firm which is the last, nth, firm to
adopt. This yields:
DpD1   DpT1 =
h
DpD1   DpX1
i
+ 2
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
s#0,
and
DpDn   DpTn =
h
DpDn   DpXn
i
+ 2
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
s#1.
The difference in profit increase for endogenous refunding versus a non-refunded emis-
sion tax is given by the sum of the difference between endogenous and exogenous refunding
(the first term), and the difference between exogenous refunding and an emission tax (the
second term). As discussed previously, the first term is on the net likely to be negative while
the second is positive. Hence, compared to exogenous refunding, it is clear that taxes are
less likely to induce a faster diffusion than endogenous refunding. Nevertheless, it is still
the case that the ”output” effect should dominate the ”refunding” effect if the number of
firms in the industry is small, to the extent that diffusion is likely to be slower under en-
dogenous refunding. These observations lead to the following proposition.
9This is consistent with the assumption that refunding of emission taxes is not the main source of revenue for
the firms.
14
Proposition 3 A technology that reduces the emission intensity of production tends to diffuse more
slowly under an endogenously refunded vs. a non-refunded emission tax the more concentrated the
industry is.
5 Incentives for continuous technological upgrading
In the previous sections, we showed under what conditions exogenous refunding helps to
speed up the path of technology adoption. However, this positive effect of refunding dis-
sipates as the average emission intensity of the industry decreases. In order to analyze to
what extent refunding provides continuous increased incentives for technological upgrad-
ing, we consider the case when further technological advance occurs at some point in the
future. This new technology, which we will call technology 2, unexpectedly arrives at some
time t2 after kT and kX firms would have already adopted technology 1 under an emission
tax and an exogenous refunded tax, respectively. As shown in the previous sections, since
the exogenous refund induces a faster adoption than the emission tax, kX  kT.
We study the difference in adoption incentives for the new technology provided by these
instruments for three groups: (1) the laggards - those firms that would not have adopted
technology 1 at t2 either under the emission tax or the refunded tax (i.e., n  kX firms), (2)
the intermediates - those firms that would have adopted technology 1 at t2 under refunding,
but would not have adopted under an emission tax (i.e., kX   kT firms), and finally, (3) the
early adopters - those firms that would have adopted technology 1 at t2 under both schemes
(i.e., kT firms). If refunding provides a continuous and larger incentive to technological
upgrading than taxes, we should expect the difference in the increase in profit rate from
adoption with and without refunding to be positive for all groups. Moreover, if refunding
produces a ”catching up” effect - understood as an increased incentive for firms dirtier than
average to adopt new technologies, we should expect the difference in profit increase for the
laggards to be unambiguously positive.
Technology 2 is characterized by a marginal production cost c2 and emission intensity
#2, with #2 < #1 < #0. Let zT2 = c2 + s#2. By assumption, we have that z
T
0 > z
T
1 > z
T
2 .
Now let m1 be the number of adopters of technology 1 and m2 be the number of adopters
of technology 2. At time t2, we thus have m1 = k and m2 = 0. Further, let p2(m1,m2) be
the profit rate for firm j when m1 firms have adopted technology 1, m2 firms have adopted
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technology 2, and firm j is among the adopters of technology 2. We define p1(m1,m2) and
p0(m1,m2) accordingly. The firm which has not adopted technology 1 at time t2 now has the
choice between two technologies. However, for simplicity, we assume that p2(t), the present
value cost at time t2 of investing in technology 2 at t, is not larger than the cost of investing in
technology 1 at t, i.e., p2(t)  p1(t)ert2 for t  t2. This implies that it will never be profitable
to adopt technology 1 once technology 2 has appeared10.
The lower marginal costs imply higher profit rates with technology 2 compared to both
technology 1 and technology 0. The increase in profit rates from adoption of technology 2
will thus be higher for a firmwhich produces with technology 0 than for a firmwhich has al-
ready adopted technology 1. I.e., the following conditions apply: p2(m1,m2) > p1(m1,m2) >
p0(m1,m2) as well as p2(m1,m2 + 1)  p0(m1,m2) > p2(m1  1,m2 + 1)  p1(m1,m2) for all
m1,m2 for which m1 + m2 < n. Furthermore, we assume that p2(t) (defined for t  t2) is
a differentiable convex function for which p02(t2)  p0(k, 0)   p2(k, 1), limt !¥ p02(t) > 0
and p002 (t) > re rt (p2(k, 1)  p0(k, 0)) . Lastly, we define Dp02,j = p2(k, j)  p0(k, j  1) and
Dp12,j = p2(n  j, j)  p1(n  j+ 1, j  1).
We can now determine the optimal adoption dates for technology 2 for the three groups
of firms from first order conditions similar to (1) (see more details on the results in this
section in Appendix D). The n  k firms which produce with technology 0 at t2 will first find
it profitable to adopt technology 2 at tj , implicitly defined by
Dp02,j e
 r[tj  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1, n   k,, and the k firms which produce with technology 1 at t2 will
adopt technology 2 at tj , implicitly defined by
Dp12,j e
 r[tj  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0
for j = n  k+ 1, n  k+ 2, ..., n  1, n.
To analyze the schedule of adoption dates for technology 2, we again need to analyze the
difference in the increase in profit rate from adoption with and without refunding for each
position in the adoption sequence.
10This is not a necessary condition for technology 2 to always be preferred. What is required is that the net
present value of adopting technology 2 at some point in time after t2 is always greater than the net present value
of adopting technology 1.
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Under an emission tax, equilibrium output and profit levels for the three technologies
are11
qT0 (m1,m2) =
a  zT0  m1

zT0   zT1
 m2 zT0   zT2 
b [n+ 1]
,
qT1 (m1,m2) =
a  zT1   [n m1  m2]

zT1   zT0
 m2 zT1   zT2 
b [n+ 1]
,
qT2 (m1,m2) =
a  zT2   [n m1  m2]

zT2   zT0
 m1 zT2   zT1 
b [n+ 1]
,
and
pT0 (m1,m2) = b
h
qT0 (m1,m2)
i2
,
pT1 (m1,m2) = b
h
qT1 (m1,m)
i2
,
pT2 (m1,m2) = b
h
qT2 (m1,m2)
i2
.
Under the exogenously refunded tax, the expressions corresponding to the case with two
technologies are
qX0 (m1,m2) = q
T
0 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
,
qX1 (m1,m2) = q
T
1 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
,
qX2 (m1,m2) = q
T
2 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
,
and
pX0 (m1,m2) = b
h
qX0 (m1,m2)
i2
= b
"
qT0 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
#2
,
pX1 (m1,m2) = b
h
qX1 (m1,m2)
i2
= b
"
qT1 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
#2
,
pX2 (m1,m2) = b
h
qX2 (m1,m2)
i2
= b
"
qT2 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
#2
.
where
#X(m1,m2) =
m2#2qX2 (m1,m2) +m1#1q
X
1 (m1,m2) + [n m1  m2] #0qX0 (m1,m2)
m2qX2 (m1,m2) +m1q
X
1 (m1,m2) + [n m1  m2] qX0 (m1,m2)
.
11As seen from the expression below, qT0 > 0 if a  z0  m1 [z0   z1] m2 [z0   z2] > 0
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Laggards
Let us first analyze the difference in the increase in profit rate from adoption of technol-
ogy 2 with and without refunding for the laggards which would not have adopted technol-
ogy 1 by t2 under either policy and are therefore producing with technology 0. Because
#R(kR, j) = #R(kR, j   1) from the perspective of the firm under exogenous refunding, the
difference in the profit rate increase from adoption of technology 2 under the exogenous
refunded tax compared to the emission tax is
DpX02,j   DpT02,j = 2
n

zT0   zT2

b [n+ 1]2
hh
kT   kX
i h
zT0   zT1
i
+ s#X(kX, j)
i
, (17)
for j = 1, 2, ..., n  kX   1, n  kX.
If kX = kT, we have from (17) that, analogous to the result with two technologies,
DpX02,j > Dp
T
02,j. Hence, the adopters of technology 2 switching from technology 0 would
invest earlier under the refunded tax than under an emission tax. However, if kX > kT,
the sign of this expression is ambiguous. A negative sign would indicate faster diffusion
of technology 2 under an emission tax than a refunded tax. The explanation for this possi-
ble outcome is simple: switching to technology 2 from technology 0 under the emission tax
can be more profitable if there are fewer competitors with technology 1 and instead more
competitors with technology 0. The sign of (17) is negative and adoption is faster under an
emission tax if the difference in profit increase coming from higher output under an emis-
sion tax is larger than the profit increase coming from the refund.
Intermediates
Let us now examine the difference in profits for the intermediates, which only exist if the
number of firms which would have adopted technology 1 by t2 under the emission tax is
lower than the number of adopters of technology 1 at t2 under the exogenous refunded tax,
i.e., kT < kX. The jth adopter, for which j 2 n  kX + 1, n  kT, would switch from tech-
nology 0 under an emission tax, and from technology 1 under a refunded tax. In the eyes of
the firms, #X(n  j, j) = #X(n  j+ 1, j  1). Therefore, the difference between the policies in
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adoption time is determined by the following:
DpX12,j   DpT02,j =
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
h
2kT
h
zT0   zT2
i
  [n  2j]
h
zT0 + z
T
1   2zT2
i
  2
h
a+ zT2
ii
+ 2
n[zT1   zT2 ]
b [n+ 1]2
s#X(n  j, j), (18)
for j 2 n  kX + 1, n  kT.
The sign of (18) is ambiguous, so the intermediates would adopt either earlier or later un-
der an exogenous refunded tax compared to a standard emission tax.
Early adopters
Finally, let us analyze the incentives to adopt technology 2 under the emission tax and the
refunded tax for those firms that would have adopted technology 1 by t2 under both policies,
i.e., the early adopters. When the first of the firms with technology 1 invests in technology 2,
there is no longer any firm using technology 0. This means that there are again only two
production technologies in the market and that results are comparable to the ones in section
4.1. Because #X(n  j, j) = #X(n  j+ 1, j  1) from the perspective of the firm, the difference
in profit rate increase is given by:
DpX12,j   DpT12,j =
2n

zT1   zT2

b [n+ 1]2
s#X(n  j, j) (19)
for j = n  kT + 1, n  kT + 2, ..., n  1, n.
(19) is positive. This indicates that the jth adopter of technology 2, which would switch
from technology 1 under both policies, invests earlier under the refunded tax than under a
standard emission tax.
In sum, our results indicate that, although exogenous refunding provides continuous
incentives for technological upgrading, these incentives are not unambiguously larger than
those provided by an emission tax. This is particularly the case for firms that are dirtier
than average (the so- called laggards). In relative terms, the gains of investing in a new
technology, in terms of increased output and refunding, dissipates as the overall industry
becomes cleaner. The previous findings can be summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 A technology that reduces the emission intensity of production does not unambigu-
ously diffuse faster under an exogenously refunded tax than under a non-refunded emission tax
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among those firms that are dirtier than average.
6 Numerical illustrations
In the following, we present simulations on the diffusion patterns and welfare effects under
a standard emission tax as well as exogenous and endogenous refunding.
6.1 Diffusion
To illustrate the diffusion patterns under the policies and how the patterns are affected by the
degree of market concentration, we present numerical simulations for an industry composed
of 5 and 15 firms, respectively. For the simulations, we assume the following function for the
present value of the investment cost
p1(t) = K1e [q+r]t
where q > 0 captures drivers such as learning and technological progress which lead to
decreasing investment costs over time (here assumed exogenous and generating a constant
rate of decrease in costs). We assume q = 3%, r = 6% and K1 = 20 and for the remaining
parameters a = 10, b = 1, #0 = 1, #1 = 0.5, c0 = c1 = 1 and s = 1.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the adoption times for each firm in the sequence. We see from
Figure 1 with n = 5 firms that, for this set of parameters, the exogenous refunded tax in-
duces a faster diffusion than the non-refunded emission tax, just as discussed in section 4.1.
However, with endogenous refunding, the firms would adopt later than under exogenous
refunding, as well as later than they would under a non-refunded emission tax. Figure 3
illustrates the contribution from the ”output” and ”refunding” effects to the difference be-
tween endogenous and exogenous refunding. As discussed in section 4.2, the output effect
dominates the refunding effect, such that, on net, the difference is negative for each adopter
in the adoption sequence. We also see that, even though the additional difference between
exogenous refunding and a non-refunded tax is positive, the net difference between endoge-
nous refunding and an emission tax is still negative.
With n = 15 firms in Figure 2, diffusion takes longer since gains from adoption are lower.
Here, also, the exogenous refunded tax induces faster diffusion than the non-refunded emis-
sion tax. However, with endogenous refunding, the first firm would adopt at a point in
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time very close to but later than the adoption time under the emission tax, while the last
firm would adopt earlier than under an emission tax and at a point in time very close to the
adoption time under the exogenous refunded tax. With n = 15 firms, differences in adoption
times are, however, relatively small. This illustrates that, as the number of firms increases,
the diffusion pattern under a refunded tax also approaches the pattern under a standard
emission tax.
In Figure 4, the difference in profit increase between endogenous and exogenous refund-
ing is disaggregated into ”output” and ”refunding” effects with 15 firms in the industry. It
is still true that the output effect dominates the refunding effect such that diffusion is slower
under endogenous versus exogenous refunding for each firm in the sequence. However, the
relatively larger difference in profit increase between exogenous refunding and an emission
tax implies that, on net, endogenous refunding induces faster adoption than an emission tax
for all but the first firm in the adoption sequence, as also noted from Figure 2. Figure 4 also
illustrates that, for n = 15, the outcome under endogenous refunding is well approximated
by the outcome under exogenous refunding for firms later in the adoption sequence.
6.2 Welfare
The policies have different effects on welfare because of the different patterns of adoption.
Faster diffusion of the cost-reducing technology raises consumer surplus and lowers en-
vironmental damages in present value terms for the whole diffusion period but also raises
total investment costs. Welfare effects are also different under the policies because, evenwith
the same number of adopters at a certain point in time, equilibrium output and aggregate
emissions differ12.
With m1 adopters of the new technology, consumer surplus is given by
CS(m1) =
b
2
[Q(m1)]2
We assume that the emitted substance is a flow pollutant which causes damages only in
the current period and has a constant value of marginal damage from emissions d = 1. Total
12The welfare comparison is made between outcomes under the two policies for the same level of the emission
tax. Because of the refund, equilibrium output and aggregate emissions differ. From a welfare comparison
perspective, one could argue that the relevant comparison is between different tax rates under the two policies
which induce the same level of aggregate emissions. However, for this model, there is no emission tax level
other than zero that induces the same level of emissions under the two policies before diffusion has started and
after the technology has completely diffused into the industry.
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environmental damages D at a point in time with m1 adopters of the new technology is then
given by
D(m1) = dE(m1)
Net tax revenues are TR(m1) = sE(m1) under the emission tax. In contrast, TR(m1) = 0
under the refunded tax since all the tax revenues are refunded back to the firms and included
in firm profits.
The welfare rate (or instantaneous welfare), w(m1), excluding investment costs, with
m1 adopters of the new technology is the sum of consumer surplus, firm profits and tax
revenues minus environmental damages and is given by
w(m1) = CS(m1) + [n m1]p0(m1) +m1p1(m1) + TR(m1)  D(m1)
Total discounted welfareW net of investment costs can now be written
W =
n
å
m1=0
264
tm1+1Z
tm1
w(m1)e rtdt
375  nå
m1=1
p(tm1)
with t0 = 0 and tn+1 = ¥.
Tables 1 and 2 show the welfare levels over time under an emission tax, an exogenous
refunded tax and an endogenous refunded tax with 5 and 15 firms, respectively. Adoption
times are the same as in the previous section, with tm1 determining the start of the m1th
period with current value of the welfare rate w(m1) at each point in time. We see from table
1 that, for n = 5, discounted welfare is similar under exogenous and endogenous refunding.
It appears that the benefit of reaching higher welfare rates with the faster diffusion in the
first case is matched by the benefit of lower investment cost with slower diffusion in the
second.
Discounted welfare is lower under the emission tax compared to both refunding situa-
tions. This is not driven by differences in how early clean production is traded for lower
investment cost but by a difference in the level of welfare. This welfare difference comes
from the fact that we have assumed that consumer surplus is quadratic in aggregate pro-
duction while environmental damage is linear in aggregate emissions. This leads to higher
welfare rates with a refund since more production is valued more highly than less emissions
at the margin. Had we assumed that environmental damages were quadratic in aggregate
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emissions, the opposite would have been true, i.e., welfare rates would have been higher
without refunding.
Table 2 shows the welfare outcomes with n = 15 firms. Comparing outcomes for the
same policy with n = 5 and n = 15, consumer surplus and emissions are higher and firm
profits lower for all three policy situations. With more competition in the industry, the ben-
efits of adoption for an individual firm are significantly lower and therefore diffusion is
slower than with only five firms in the industry. Both welfare rates and adoption times are
so similar with 15 firms that there is, in practice, no difference in the value of discounted
welfare across policies.
Note that, when it comes to output, our simulations indicate that non-adopters do pro-
duce slightly more and adopters slightly less with endogenous refunding compared to the
case with exogenous refunding in line with Fischer (2011) and as discussed in section 4.2.
However, at the aggregate level, output does not differ significantly between the two re-
funding situations, which explains why consumer surplus is almost the same in both cases.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrates how the level of aggregate emissions develops over time under
the different policies. The figures show that the difference in the level of aggregate emissions
between the policies is smaller after the new technology has been completely diffused into
the industry. This is driven by the fact that the additional output under the refunded tax is
then produced with lower emission intensity, and also because the difference in aggregate
output is smaller between the two policies.
7 Conclusions
The main conclusion is that a refunded emission tax speeds up diffusion in an imperfectly
competitive industry relative to a non-refunded emission tax if firms do not strategically
influence the size of the refund. If they do, diffusion is, in contrast, likely to be slower than
under a non-refunded emission tax if the industry is highly concentrated.
It is straightforward to see that, as the number of firms increases and the equilibrium
comes closer to the outcome under perfect competition, the difference in diffusion patterns
with andwithout refunding goes to zero. However, our findings are only valid in the context
of an outputmarket that is not perfectly competitive. If there is perfect competition, diffusion
is not an equilibrium since, in that case, adoption would yield the same incremental benefits
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to all firms.
These results should apply to end-of-pipe technologies that convert a certain proportion
of emissions. For energy production, the findings also should be valid for fuel efficiency
improving technologies when it comes to pollutants such as CO2 and SO2. The implications
of refunding for other types of abatement technologies is a potential area for future research.
Our results are based on the assumption that firms do not anticipate the appearance of
a more efficient technology farther into the future. Allowing for such anticipation should
delay optimal adoption times but, for this to alter the main comparative results, the effect of
refunding would have to interact with the anticipation effect.
We have focused only on the incentives to technological diffusion provided by output-
based refunding. Refunding might also be based on investments in abatement technologies,
like the Norwegian NOx fund from which emission fee revenues are refunded in proportion
to abatement expenditure (see Hagem et al., 2012). Such a case is outside the scope of our
study, and further research is needed to understand the incentives provided by that type of
scheme.
The welfare implications of the differences in diffusion patterns under our particular as-
sumptions appear to be small. There could be a more relevant difference from a welfare
point of view if faster diffusion also speeds up learning and endogenously lowers invest-
ment costs. There should also be larger benefits to faster diffusion if emissions are a stock
pollutant.
The fact that the rate of technology adoption is influenced by (exogenous) refunding is
potentially good news for a regulator, who has political constraints on the level of the tax to
be imposed, but wants to promote faster uptake of existing abatement technologies as a way
to speed up the pace of emission reductions.
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Figure 1: Diffusion with 5 firms in the industry
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Figure 2: Diffusion with 15 firms in the industry
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Figure 3: Output and endogenous refunding effects explaining net differences in profit in-
crease from adoption with 5 firms in the industry. T refers to emission tax, X to exogenous
refunded tax and D to endogenous refunded tax.
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Figure 4: Output and endogenous refunding effects explaining net differences in profit in-
crease from adoption with 15 firms in the industry. T refers to emission tax, X to exogenous
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Figure 5: Aggregate emissions over time with 5 firms in the industry.
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Figure 6: Aggregate emissions over time with 15 firms in the industry.
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Appendices
A Demonstration of Nash equilibrium - Reinganum (1981)
(1i) p0(m  1)  0 and p1(m)  0
(1ii) p1(m  1)  p0(m  2) > p1(m)  p0(m  1) > 0 for all m < n.
(2i) p0(0)  p0(0)  p1(1)
(2ii) limt !¥ p0(t) > 0
(2iii) p00(t) > re rt (p1(1)  p0(0))
Demonstration very similar to Reinganum (1981).
Proposition Given a weak ordering of adoption dates t1  t2  ...  tn, each firm has a
unique optimal adoption date ti such that 0  t1 < t2 < .. < tn < ¥.
Proof From assumption 1 and 2iii, Vi is strictly concave in ti for ti 2 (ti 1, ti+1), so first-
order conditions are necessary and sufficient for finding an optimal date of adoption ti .
Furthermore, by assumption 2i ¶V
1
¶t1 t1=0
= p0(0)  p1(1)  p0(0)  0 and thus t1  0. By
assumption 2ii limt !¥ p0(t) > 0 , it also follows that limtn !¥ ¶V
n
¶tn
=  p0(tn) < 0 which
implies that tn < ¥.
We also need to show that ti 2 (ti 1, ti+1). If we evaluate ¶V
i
¶ti
at ti = ti 1, we get
¶Vi
¶ti ti=ti 1
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti 1   p0(ti 1)
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti 1   (p0(i  2)  p1(i  1)) e rti 1
which is strictly positive by assumption 1ii.
Similarly, we evaluate ¶V
i
¶ti
at ti = ti+1
¶Vi
¶ti ti=ti+1
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti+1   p0(ti+1)
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti 1   (p0(i)  p1(i+ 1)) e rti 1
which is strictly negative by assumption 1ii.
Since Vi is strictly concave in ti and ¶V
i
¶ti ti=t

i
= 0, the unique maximum is achieved at
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ti 2 (ti 1, ti+1). Q.E.D.
We also need to demonstrate that t = (t1 , t

2 , .., t

n ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition t = (t1 , t

2 , .., t

n ) as defined by (1) is a Nash equilibrium in adoption dates.
Proof If t = (t1 , t

2 , .., t

n ) is a Nash equilibrium itmust be that, given t1 , t

2 , .., t

i 1, t

i+1, ..., t

n ,
i will prefer ti to any other date T. First, suppose i chooses a T 2

tk 1, t

k

where k < i
Vi(t1 , t

2 , .., t

i 1, t

i+1, ..., t

n , T) =
k 2
å
m=0
tm+1Z
tm
p0(m)e rtdt+
TZ
tk 1
p0(k  1)e rtdt
+
tkZ
T
p1(k)e rtdt+
i 2
å
m=k
tm+1Z
tm
p1(m+ 1)e rtdt
+
ti+1Z
ti 1
p1(i)e rtdt+
n
å
m=i+1
tm+1Z
tm
p1(m)e rtdt  p(T)
Maximizing with respect to T gives
(p0(k  1)  p1(k)) e rT   p0(T) = 0
That is T = tk . That is, in each interval

tk 1, t

k

, with k < i, Vi reaches its maximum
at the right boundary tk .
Next, suppose i chooses a T 2 tk , tk+1 where k > i
Vi(t1 , t

2 , .., t

i 1, t

i+1, ..., t

n , T) =
i 2
å
m=0
tm+1Z
tm
p0(m)e rtdt+
ti+1Z
ti 1
p0(i  1)e rtdt
+
k 2
å
m=i
tm+1Z
tm
p0(m)e rtdt+
TZ
tk
p0(k  1)e rtdt
+
tk+1Z
T
p1(k)e rtdt+
n
å
m=k+1
tm+1Z
tm
p1(m)e rtdt  p(T)
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Maximizing with respect to T gives
(p0(k  1)  p1(k)) e rT   p0(T) = 0
That is, T = tk . That is, in each interval

tk , t

k+1

, with k > i, Vi reaches its maximum
at the left boundary tk . Thus, the maximum of V
i must be in

ti 1, t

i+1

. We already know
from the previous demonstration that the maximum on that interval is ti . We have thus
demonstrated that, given t1 , t

2 , .., t

i 1, t

i+1, ..., t

n , iwill prefer T = ti to all other T 2 [0,¥) .
t = (t1 , t

2 , .., t

n ) is therefore a Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D
A.1 Assumption 1ii)
For the existence of a Nash equilibrium, we need to check that assumption 1ii holds under
the different policies.
A.1.1 Emission tax
Let us consider first the case of taxes. Let zT1 = c1 + s#1, z
T
0 = c0 + s#0 and r =
1
b[n+1]2
. Then,
p1(m1   1) = r
h
a  [n m1 + 2] zT1 + [n m1 + 1] zT0
i2
,
p0(m1   2) = r
h
a+ [m1   2] zT1   [m1   1] zT0
i2
,
and thus DpTm1 1 = p1(m1   1)  p0(m1   2) is equal to:
DpTm1 1 = r
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i h
n2
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i
  2n
h
a+ [m1   2] zT1 + [m1   1] zT0
ii
.
By analogy, DpTm1 = p1(m1)  p0(m1   1) is equal to:,
DpTm1 = r
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i h
n2
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i
  2n
h
a+ [m1   1] zT1 +m1zT0
ii
.
and hence:
DpTm1 1   DpTm1 = 2nr
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i2
> 0 _ _m1  2.
That is, assumption 1ii holds under the emission tax.
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A.1.2 Exogenous refunded tax
Since under the exogenously refunded tax #X(m1) = #X(m1   1), DpXm1 1   DpXm1 can be
represented as:
DpXm1 1   DpXm1 = DpTm1 1   DpTm1+ (20)
2s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
hh
qT1 (m1   1)  qT0 (m1   2)
i
 
h
qT1 (m1)  qT0 (m1   1)
ii
, (21)
Since qT1 (m1)  qT0 (m1   1) =
n[zT1 zT0 ]
b[n+1] , equation (20) simplifies to:
DpXm1 1   DpXm1 = 2nr
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i2
> 0 _m1  2.
A.1.3 Endogenous refunded tax
DpDm1 1   DpDm1 = b

1  s
bQD (m1   1)
h
#1   #D(m1   1)
i h
qD1 (m1   1)
i2
  b

1  s
bQD (m1   2)
h
#0   #D(m1   2)
i h
qD0 (m1   2)
i2
  b

1  s
bQD (m1)
h
#1   #D(m1)
i h
qD1 (m1)
i2
+ b

1  s
bQD (m1   1)
h
#0   #D(m1   1)
i h
qD0 (m1   1)
i2
.
Since #0   #D(m1) = m1sD1 (m)d, and #1   #D(m1) =   [n m1] sD0 (m1)d, this equation can be
represented as:
DpDm1 1   DpDm1 = b

1+
sd [n m1 + 1] sD0 (m1   1)
bQD (m1   1)
 h
qD1 (m1   1)
i2
  b

1  sd [m1   2] s
D
1 (m1   2)
bQD (m1   2)
 h
qD0 (m1   2)
i2
  b

1+
sd [n m1] sD0 (m1)
bQD (m1)
 h
qD1 (m1)
i2
+ b

1  sd [m1   1] s
D
1 (m1   1)
bQD (m1   1)
 h
qD0 (m1   1)
i2
.
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DpDm1 1   DpDm1 > 0 _m1  2 if and only if:
b
h
qD1 (m1   1)
i2   hqD1 (m1)i2
+ sd [n m1]
h
sD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qD1 (m1   1)  sD0 (m1)sD1 (m1)qD1 (m1)
i
+ sdsD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qD1 (m1   1)
>
b
h
qD0 (m1   2)
i2   hqD0 (m1   1)i2
+ sd [m1   1]
h
sD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qD0 (m1   1)  sD0 (m1   2)sD1 (m1   2)qD0 (m1   2)
i
+ sdsD0 (m1   2)sD1 (m1   2)qD0 (m1   2).
We have that sD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qDj (m1   1) ' sD0 (m1)sD1 (m1)qDj (m1) _m1 6= 1, n & j 2
f0, 1g13 and thus this expression simplifies to:
b
h
qD1 (m1   1)
i2   hqD0 (m1   2)i2+ sdsD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qD1 (m1   1)
>
b
h
qD1 (m1)
i2   hqD0 (m1   1)i2+ sdsD0 (m1   2)sD1 (m1   2)qD0 (m1   2).
Finally, if qD1 (m1) > q
D
0 (m1   1) _ m1  2, we expect this condition to be satisfied.
B Cournot equilbrium with two technologies
We leave the completely analogous derivation of the equiilbrium for three technologies to
the interested reader.
B.1 Emission tax
Let zT0 = c0 + s#0 denote marginal costs inclusive of emission tax payments under an emis-
sion tax before adoption of the new technology and let zT1 = c1 + s#1 denote marginal costs
after adoption. If we have m1 adopters of the new technology and rank the firms accord-
ing to their order in the adoption sequence (taking it as given), we can write the profit rate
maximization problem for the adopters as
13Note that sD1 (0) = 0, and s
D
0 (n) = 0.
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p j = max
qj
h
P(Q)  zT1
i
qj,
for j  m1,
and the profit maximization problem for the n m1 non-adopters as
p j = max
qj
h
P(Q)  zT0
i
qj,
for j > m1
Substituting in P(Q) = a  båni=1 qi, the first order condition for the adopters is
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   zT1
2b
,
and the first order condition for the non-adopters
qj =
a  båi 6=k qi   zT0
2b
.
Since the m1 adopters are symmetric they will all have the same profit-maximizing level
of production. We denote this profit-maximizing level qT1 . Similarly, the level of production
is the same for all n  m1 non-adopters and we denote this profit-maximizing level qT0 . We
thus have the following equilibrium conditions
qT1 =
a  b [m1   1] qT1 + [n m1] qT0   zT1
2b
,
qT0 =
a  b m1qT1 + [n m1   1] qT0   zT0
2b
.
Solving for qT1 and q
T
0 , we find the levels of equilibrium output for adopters and non-
adopters, respectively
qT1 (m) =
a  zT1 + [n m1]

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]
,
qT0 (m) =
a  zT0  m1

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]
, (22)
yielding equilibrium price
PT(m) =
a+m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0
[n+ 1]
,
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and equilibrium profits for adopters and non-adopters, respectively,
pT1 (m1) =
h
PT(m1)  zT1
i
qT1 (m1) =

a+m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0
[n+ 1]
  z1

qT1 (m1) = b
h
qT1 (m1)
i2
.
pT0 (m1) =
h
PT(m1)  zT0
i
qT0 (m1) =

a+m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0
[n+ 1]
  z0

qT0 (m1) = b
h
qT0 (m1)
i2
.
For interior solutions with qT0 (m1) > 0 for all m1 < n, we see from (22) that this requires
a  z0   [n  1] [z0   z1] > 0 to be true.
B.2 Exogenously refunded tax
Similarly, under an exogenously refunded tax, the profit maximization problems for the
adopters and non-adopters, respectively, are
p j = max
qj

[P(Q)  c1   s#1] qj + sEq
j
Q

= max
qj
h
P(Q)  zT1 + s#
i
qj, (23)
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
p j = max
qj
[P(Q)  c0   s#0] qj + sEq
j
Q
= max
qj
h
P(Q)  zT0 + s#
i
qj, (24)
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
with aggregate emissions (E) and aggregate output (Q) are given by:
E =
n
å
i=1
#iqi.
Q =
n
å
i=1
qi.
First-order conditions for the adopters and non-adopters are
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   zT1 + s#
2b
,
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1, and
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   zT0 + s#
2b
,
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for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Substituting in the profit-maximizing levels qX1 for the m1 adopters and q
X
0 for the n m1
non-adopters, we can write
qX1 (m1) =
a  zT1 + [n m1]

zT0   zT1

+ s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
= qT1 (m1) +
s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
,
qX0 (m1) =
a  zT0  m1

zT0   zT1

+ s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
= qT0 (m1) +
s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
.
and the average emission intensity is #X(m1) =
m1#1qX1 +[n m1]#0qX0
m1qX1 +[n m1]qX0
> 0.
PX(m) =
a+m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0   sn#X(m1)
[n+ 1]
Equilibrium profits for adopters and non-adopters, respectively,
pX1 (m1) =
h
PX(m1)  zT1 + s#X(m1)
i
qX1 (m1) =
"
a  zT1 + [n m1]

zT0   zT1

+ s#X(m1)
[n+ 1]
#
qX1 (m1),
= b
h
qX1 (m1)
i2
,
pX0 (m1) =
h
PX(m1)  zT0 + s#X(m1)
i
qX0 (m1) =
"
a  zT0 +m1

zT1   zT0

+ s#X(m1)
[n+ 1]
#
qx0(m1),
= b
h
qX0 (m1)
i2
.
B.3 Endogenously refunded tax
Under an endogenously refunded tax, the profit maximization problems for the adopters
and non-adopters are the same as the ones for the exogenously refunded tax found in (23)
and (24), respectively. However, when the firm recognizes that it can influence the size of
the refund, the first-order conditions are
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   c1   s [#1   #]h
2b  s [#1   #] 1Q
i ,
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   c0   s [#0   #]h
2b  s [#0   #] 1Q
i ,
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
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Substituting in the profit-maximizing levels qD1 for the m1 adopters and q
D
0 for the n m1
non-adopters, and suppressing the argument of m1 for clarity, we can write
qD1 =
h
1  sbQD

#0   #D
i 
a  zT1 + s#D

+ [n m1]

zT0   zT1

f
, (25)
qD0 =
h
1  sbQD

#1   #D
i 
a  zT0 + s#D
 m1 zT0   zT1 
f
, (26)
where
f = b [n+ 1] +
1
b

s
QD
2 h
#1   #D
i h
#0   #D
i
  s
QD
hh
#1   #D
i
[n m1 + 1] +
h
#0   #D
i
[m1 + 1]
i
> 0
_m.
Substituting (25) and (26) into PD = a  bQD with QD = m1qD1 + [n m1] qD0 , we get
pD1 =
h
PD   zT1 + s#D
i
qD1 ,
= b

1  s
bQD
h
#1   #D
i h
qD1
i2
.
pD0 =
h
PD   zT0 + s#D
i
qD0 ,
= b

1  s
bQD
h
#0   #D
i h
qD0
i2
.
C Comparison of endogenous versus exogenous refunding
Rewriting the equilibrium conditions (10) for the m1 adopters as
a  bQD(m1)  bqD1 (m1) = c1 + s
h
#1   #D(m1)
i 
1  q
D
1 (m1)
QD

,
and (11) for the n m1 adopters as
a  bQD(m1)  bqD0 (m1) = c0 + s
h
#0   #D(m1)
i 
1  q
D
0 (m1)
QD

,
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we can sum over all n conditions to get
m1
h
a  bQD(m1)  bqD1 (m1)
i
+ [n m1]
h
a  bQD(m1)  bqD0 (m1)
i
= m1

c1 + s
h
#1   #D(m1)
i 
1  q
D
1 (m1)
QD

+ [n m1]

c0 + s
h
#0   #D(m1)
i 
1  q
D
0 (m1)
QD

This simplifies to
na  [n+ 1] bQD(m1) = m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0   ns#D(m1)
  s

m1#1
qD1 (m1)
QD
+ [n m1] #0 q
D
0 (m1)
QD

+ s#D(m1)

m1
qD1 (m1)
QD
+ [n m1] q
D
0 (m1)
QD

yielding
QD(m1) =
na m1zT1   [n m1] zT0 + ns#D(m1)
b [n+ 1]
.
Similarly, using the n equilibrium conditions in (4) and (5), we get
QX(m1) =
na m1zT1   [n m1] zT0 + ns#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
.
Hence,
QD(m1) QX(m1) =
ns

#D(m1)  #X(m1)

b [n+ 1]
,
The first-order conditions under policy k 2 fT,X,Dg and technology j 2 f0, 1g can also
be written
a  bQk   bqkj = ykj .
where ykj denotes the marginal cost inclusive of the costs of the emissions policy. We drop
the argument of m1 for clarity. We can then write
qkj =
a  ykj
b
 Qk,
with
yTj = z
T
j ,
yXj = cj + s
h
# j   #R
i
,
yDj = cj + s
h
# j   #R
i "
1 
qDj
QD
#
.
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Comparing equilibrium quantities under exogenous and endogenous refunding for adopters,
we can write
qX1   qD1 =
yD1   yX1
b
+QD  QX,
=
c1 + s

#1   #D
 h
1  qD1QD
i
  c1 + s #1   #X
b
+
ns
b [n+ 1]
h
#D   #X
i
,
= s

#D   #1

qD1 [n+ 1] 

#D   #XQD
b [n+ 1]QD
> 0,
since

#D (m1)  #1

>

#D (m1)  #X (m1)

and qD1 (m1) [n+ 1] > Q
D (m1) for 0 < m1 <
n.
Furthermore, for non-adopters, we can write
qX0   qD0 =
yD0   yX0
b
+QD  QX,
=
h
c0 + s

#0   #D
 h
1  qD0QD
ii
  c0 + s #0   #X
b
+
ns
b [n+ 1]
h
#D   #X
i
,
=
 s #0   #D qD0 [n+ 1] + s #X   #DQD
b [n+ 1]QD
.
=
 sm1dsD1 [n+ 1] qD0   s

sX1   sD1

m1dQD
b [n+ 1]QD
.
which implies that qX0 < q
D
0 _sX1  sD1 .
D Optimal adoption times with three technologies
Given an ordering of adoption dates t1  t2  ...  tj  ...  tn for technology 2, where
the first n  k adopters switch from technology 0 and the following k adopters switch from
technology 1, we can write the present value of adopting technology 2 for firm j at tj as
V j2(t1, ..., tj 1, tj, tj+1, ..., tn) =
j 1
å
m2=0
tm2+1Z
tm2
p0(k,m2)e r[ t t2]dt
+
n k
å
m2=j
tm2+1Z
tm2
p2(k,m2)e r[ t t2] dt
+
n
å
m2=n k+1
tm2+1Z
tm2
p2(n m2,m2)e r[ t t2] dt  p2(tj)
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for j = 1, 2, ..., n  k and
V j2(t1, ..., tj 1, tj, tj+1, ..., tn) =
n k 1
å
m2=0
tm2+1Z
tm2
p1(k,m2)e r[ t t2] dt
+
j 1
å
m2=n k
tm2+1Z
tm2
p1(n m2,m2)e r[ t t2] dt
+
n
å
m2=j
tm2+1Z
tm2
p2(n m2,m2)e r[ t t2] dt  p2(tj)
for j = n  k+ 1, n  k+ 2, ..., n  1, n and where t0 = t2 and tn+1 = ¥.
From the assumptions that p2(m1,m2) > p1(m1,m2) > p0(m1,m2)  0, p2(m1,m2 +
1)   p0(m1,m2) > p2(m1   1,m2 + 1)   p1(m1,m2) for all m1,m2 for which m1 + m2 < n
and p002 (t) > re rt (p2(k, 1)  p0(k, 0)) , V j2 is strictly concave in tj for tj 2

tj 1, tj+1

, which
implies that first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for determining
tj . The first-order conditions are
¶V j2
¶tj
= [p0(k, j  1)  p2(k, j)] e r[ t

j  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0 (27)
for j = 1, 2, ..., n  k and
¶V j2
¶tj
= [p1(n  j+ 1, j  1)  p2(n  j, j)] e r[ t

j  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0 (28)
for j = n  k+ 1, ..., n  1, n.
We now define Dp02,j = p2(k, j)   p0(k, j   1) and Dp12,j = p2(n   j, j)   p1(n   j +
1, j  1) and we can then write (27) and (28) as
¶V j2
¶tj
=  Dp02,je r[ t

j  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0
for j = 1, 2, ..., n  k and
¶V j2
¶tj
=  Dp12,je r[ t

j  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0
for j = n  k+ 1, ..., n  1, n.
From the assumptions that p2(t) < p1(t)ert2 and c2 + s#2 < c1 + s#1, we know that
firms which have not adopted technology 1 by date t2 will not have an incentive to adopt
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it after technology 2 has appeared at t2. Therefore, at t2, the firms only face the decision of
when to adopt technology 2. (A demonstration of a Nash equilibrium in the adoption times
implicitly defined by (27) and (28) is available upon request.)
For the laggards, the increase in profit rate under the emission tax, DpT02,j, for the firm
which is the jth to adopt technology 2 and switches from technology 0 under a refunded tax,
is given by:
DpT02,j = p
T
2 (k
T, j)  pT0 (kT, j  1) = b
h
qT2 (k
T, j)
i2   b hqT0 (kT, j  1)i2
for j = 1, 2., ..., n  kT   1, n  kT,
and the increase in profit rate under the exogenously refunded tax, DpX02,j, by:
DpX02,j = p
X
2 (k
X, j)  pX0 (kX, j  1)
= b
"
qT2 (k
X, j) +
s#X(kX, j)
b [n+ 1]
#2
  b
"
qT0 (k
X, j  1) + s#
X(kX, j  1)
b [n+ 1]
#2
for j = 1, 2, ..., n  kX   1, n  kX.
The difference in the increase in profit rate from adoption of technology 2 under the
exogenous refunded tax compared to the emission tax for the jth adopter of technology 2,
which would switch from technology 0 under both policies, is thus equal to:
DpX02,j   DpT02,j = b
"
qT2 (k
X, j) +
s#X(kX, j)
b [n+ 1]
#2
  b
"
qT0 (k
X, j  1) + s#
X(kX, j  1)
b [n+ 1]
#2
 

b
h
qT2 (k
T, j)
i2   b hqT0 (kT, j  1)i2 ,
for j = 1, 2, ..., n   kX   1, n   kX. If, as before, we assume that one firm switching from
technology 0 to technology 2 considers its own impact on the refund as negligible, i.e.,
#X(kX, j) = #X(kX, j  1), and use that
qT2 (k
X, j)  qT2 (kT, j) = qT0 (kX, j  1)  qT0 (kT, j  1) =
[kT   kX][zT0   zT2 ]
b[n+ 1]
,
and
qT2 (k
X, j)  qT0 (kX, j  1) = qT2 (kT, j)  qT0 (kT, j  1) =
n

zT0   zT2

b [n+ 1]
,
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the difference in profit rate increase for the laggards simplifies to:
DpX02,j   DpT02,j = 2
n

zT0   zT2

b [n+ 1]2
hh
kT   kX
i h
zT0   zT1
i
+ s#X(kX, j)
i
.
The intermediates exist only if the number of firms which would have adopted tech-
nology 1 by t2 under the emission tax is lower than the number of adopters of technol-
ogy 1 at t2 under the exogenous refunded tax, i.e., kT < kX. The jth adopter, for which
j 2 n  kX + 1, n  kT, would switch from technology 0 under an emission tax, and from
technology 1 under a refunded tax. The difference in adoption time between the policies is
then determined by the following difference:
DpX12,j   DpT02,j = b
"
qT2 (n  j, j) +
s#X(n  j, j)
b [n+ 1]
#2
  b
"
qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1) +
s#X(n  j+ 1, j  1)
b [n+ 1]
#2
 

b
h
qT2 (k
T, j)
i2   b hqT0 (kT, j  1)i2
Since #X(n  j, j) = #X(n  j+ 1, j  1) from the perspective of the firm, we have
qT2 (n  j, j)  qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1) =
n

zT1   zT2

b [n+ 1]
qT2 (n  j, j) + qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1) =
2a  [n  2 [j+ 1]] zT2 + [n  2j] zT1
b [n+ 1]
qT2 (k
T, j) + qT0 (k
T, j  1) = 2a+ [n  2j]

zT0   zT2
  2kT zT0   zT1   2zT2
b [n+ 1]
, so that we can simplify the difference in profit rate increase to
DpX12,j   DpT02,j =
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
h
2kT
h
zT0   zT2
i
  [n  2j]
h
zT0 + z
T
1   2zT2
i
  2
h
a+ zT2
ii
+ 2
n[zT1   zT2 ]
b [n+ 1]2
s#X(n  j, j)
For the early adopters the increase in profit rate from adoption of technology 2 under an
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emission tax is
DpT12,j = p
T
2 (n  j, j)  pT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1)
= b

qT2 (n  j, j)2  
h
qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1)
i2
for j = n  kT + 1, n  kT + 2, ..., n  1, n,
and under an exogenous refunded tax:
DpX12,j = p
X
2 (n  j, j)  pX1 (n  j+ 1, j  1)
= b
"
qT2 (n  j, j) +
s#X(n  j, j)
b [n+ 1]
#2
  b
"
qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1) +
s#X(n  j+ 1, j  1)
b [n+ 1]
#2
for j = n  kX + 1, n  kX + 2, ..., n  1, n. Since #X(n  j, j) = #X(n  j+ 1, j  1), the differ-
ence in profit rate increase is given by:
DpX12,j   DpT12,j = 2b
h
qT2 (n  j, j)  qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1)
i s#X(n  j, j)
b [n+ 1]
for j = n  kT + 1, n  kT + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Using similar tricks as before, this becomes:
DpX12,j   DpT12,j =
2n

zT1   zT2

b [n+ 1]2
s#X(n  j, j)
for j = n  kT + 1, n  kT + 2, ..., n.
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